While much of the world is watching the dramatic events in Southwest Asia – operations for which U.S. Pacific Command is a primary provider of forces – these activities do not eclipse the importance of threats to global security in the Asia-Pacific region. That is why I mentioned this subject in the Spring 2003 issue of this magazine, and why, in late June 2003, I testified before the United States Congress concerning our four primary security concerns in the region.
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Adm. Thomas B. Fargo asks a question about Malaysian counterterrorism operations during a visit hosted by Malaysia’s Chief of Defence Force, Gen. Tan Sri Dat´o Seri Mohd Zahidi bin Hj Zainuddin, while Lt. Gen. Datuk Mohamad Azumi Mohamed, Commander of the 1st Malaysian Infantry Division (at Adm. Fargo’s right rear) looks on.
Photo by Ph1 Clinton Beaird, USN |
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North Korea
First, we remain keenly focused on the Korean peninsula. While I believe the likelihood of war there is low, the stakes would be very high should it occur – and even higher if North Korea continues to pursue a nuclear capability. The Demilitarized Zone borders the most heavily armed strip of territory on Earth, while millions of South Koreans live within range of North Korea’s artillery, some of which we know to be armed with chemical warheads.
Whether it involves its Highly Enriched Uranium program or its illicit drug trade, North Korean policies and performance present problems for the entire region. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the world’s greatest missile proliferater can destabilize Northeast Asia and pose the threat of trafficking nuclear weapons or fissile material, while undermining international treaties and norms against proliferation.
Our greatest fear, of course, is the intersection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Armed with these weapons, undeterred, unaccountable enemies could inflict enormous damage without warning. It is this sobering conclusion that demonstrates the need for regional unity on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and requires multilateral cooperation to irreversibly and verifiably end North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.
The President of the United States has repeatedly stated America’s commitment to resolving this issue peacefully, and multilaterally. The Pacific Command’s job is to ensure that diplomacy is backed by viable military strength.
India, Pakistan and Taiwan Hot Spots
We also worry about miscalculation resulting in conflict between India and Pakistan or in the Taiwan Strait. I visited Kashmir late last year, gaining valuable insight into that sensitive region, where India’s border concerns include not only contested boundaries with Pakistan, but with China as well.
China and India are seeking ways to contain and resolve their differences. India and Pakistan, however, teetered on the brink of war just last year, and recurring violence creates the potential for military action. But both nations’ recent initiatives add a measure of reassurance and hope for the future.
The Taiwan Strait is the other place where miscalculation could result in a much larger conflict. Taiwan clearly remains the largest friction point in the relationship between China and the United States. We seek peaceful resolution – free from the threat or use of force – as the only acceptable path.
President Bush has made clear our support for the One China policy and the three communiqués. It is also equally clear that our national leadership and the Pacific Command are prepared and committed to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. So the relatively calm rhetoric across the Taiwan Strait in recent months has been encouraging, as has China’s assistance on the North Korean issues.
Terrorism in the Pacific
Alongside these two concerns, stands our continuing work in the war on terrorism in the Pacific theater. Besides the direct regional efforts against Al Qaida, we have been focused on threats like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), throughout Southeast Asia.
Last year, we responded to the request of the Philippines to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in southern Mindanao, including Basilan Island, then an Abu Sayyaf stronghold. Working side-by-side, this six-month effort provided a template to help the Republic of the Philippines develop a lasting counter-terrorism capacity. As a result, stability is returning to Basilan, the terrorists have been separated from the people, and normal activity – like children going to school – has returned.
Clearly, more work needs to be done. The ASG is reconstituting and active in bombing campaigns. It is looking for outside support. We have a dynamic exercise and security assistance program in place to continue to build the counterterrorist capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
The Jemaah Islamiyah has operated in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and attacked a number of interests throughout the region. This group was also responsible for the tragic Bali bombing which killed some 200 people.
We’ll remain focused on the JI, and applaud the progress of our friends in the region – including investigations by the government of Indonesia – to apprehend and bring these terrorists to justice. Well over 100 JI members have been arrested or detained to date.
Transformation
Lastly, it is against this backdrop of security challenges and opportunities that I address my final concern – Transformation. The world has changed dramatically since both the Cold War’s end and 9/11. As a result, so has our strategic guidance.
At the U.S. Pacific Command, like all regional U.S. combatant commands, our task is to “operationalize” this guidance, synchronize multiple efforts, and put them into action with regional emphasis. So we are examining new ways of commanding, supporting, and employing our forces. We call it, “Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense Strategy,” which includes six primary elements.
First, we are updating our operational plans, maximizing knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality, as demonstrated by coalition forces in Iraq. We are also strengthening our command and control arrangements to better respond to emerging security threats, concentrating on improved speed of command. Meanwhile, we’re working hard to develop expeditionary capabilities for immediate employment both in the Pacific and anywhere else they might be needed. Even our forces that are inherently expeditionary can be enhanced and integrated into new operating patterns and concepts and combined with appropriate high-speed lift and interdiction assets, to ensure responsive, regionally-tailored power, available on short notice.
Transformation compels us in a number of ways. First, it induces us to find ways to increase combat power forward in theater while reducing the burden we place on our friends and allies in the region. Our strategy then is reinforced by our goal for an enduring and improved posture and footprint that demonstrates our regional commitment and is sustainable for the long term. Too, we’ll seek the means to assist our friends and allies in integrating advancements in precision, lethality, and capabilities. Lastly, we’ll consider access and logistic prepositioning opportunities throughout the theater that allow us to move forces quickly to the location of greatest need. Transformation is so critical to our entire region and for that reason, will be the theme for this year’s Chiefs of Defense Conference scheduled for late 2003.
Exercises
The exercises detailed in this issue of the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum address these concerns and demonstrate our region’s dedication to our collective security. The counterterrorism training conducted during BALANCE IROQUOIS 2003-01, and the complex, realistic peacekeeping activities like those exercised in Bangladesh’s SHANTEE DOOT and India’s COPE INDIA illustrate clear reinforcement of our security goals. Both NORTHERN EDGE 2003 and COPE TIGER tested our command and control capabilities and the readiness of all participating forces, while employing some of the advanced concepts I discussed above. Moreover, several of these stories document our commitment to enhancing security relations and cooperation through bilateral exercises.
As exercises provide us a means to test our abilities, it remains critical that we challenge ourselves and engage in demanding trials to best prepare for the real-world threats we must confront. The poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow said, “We judge ourselves by what we feel capable of doing, while others judge us by what we have already done.” Our regional exercises then, serve to measure and assess our progress while demonstrating the merits of these programs for those who would judge them. I think you’ll find the articles in this quarter’s issue of the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum represent these merits well. |
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