The U.S. Security Strategy

PHOTO CAPTIONS:

1. This is the fourth major statement of U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific region since 1990.

2. Under U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, the 1998 strategy report is one of continuity while looking ahead to security challenges and opportunities at the turn of the century.

3. The Japan-U.S. alliance, the linchpin of U.S. security strategy in Asia, has been strengthened recently by enhanced security agreements. The Commander of the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet flies by Mount Fuji.

4. Frequent exercises hone the skills of 100,000 forward-deployed U.S. troops.

5. Interaction with the Russian military has expanded to further strengthen the bilateral relationship. Gen. of the Army Anatoliy Vasilyevich Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, meets with Lt. Gen. Randolph W. House, U.S. Deputy Commander in Chief, Pacific Command.

6. The long-term U.S. security relationship with China is based on a policy of comprehensive engagement typified by expanding military exchanges and dialogues, such as mutual naval fleet visits.

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The story of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is one of continuity, but within that larger context there is change and reaffirmation. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued its first and second East Asian Strategy Reports (EASR) in 1990 and 1992, respectively, to outline the changes we would make in our strategy and force structure in response to the end of the Cold War. In 1995, DOD issued a third report, this time noting that continuing areas of uncertainty and tension require a reaffirmation of our security commitments to the region. Where the 1990 and 1992 reports anticipated reductions in our deployed forces, the 1995 report confirmed our intention to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the region for the foreseeable future, while increasing our efforts to share security responsibilities with our friends and allies, and to broaden bilateral and multilateral engagement.

2 Photo: Helene C. Stikkel

Based on this approach, we have taken a series of strategic steps over the past three years to reduce areas of uncertainty and to reinforce the region's progress toward economic prosperity and political cooperation:

• Through the Quadrennial Defense Review, we have confirmed our ability and intention to maintain a robust overseas military presence of approximately 100,000 in the region, while harnessing new technology to retain our lead in capabilities;
• We have strengthened our alliance with Japan through the April 1996 Joint Security Declaration and the September 1997 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, working within the framework of our alliance relationship to enhance security cooperation and readiness with Japan;
• We have expanded our security cooperation and military access in Southeast Asia, while working with ASEAN states to enhance region-wide dialogue and confidence-building through the ASEAN Regional Forum;
• We are working with South Korea and China to engage North Korea through the Four Party Talks on a formula for reducing tensions and making the transition from armistice to lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula;
• We reaffirmed our security alliance with Australia through the 1996 Joint Security Declaration ("Sydney Statement") pledging mutual cooperation on regional and global security concerns;
• We continue to build the foundation for a long-term relationship with China based on comprehensive engagement, as reflected in the 1997 and 1998 Clinton-Jiang Summits and as typified by a range of military exchanges and security dialogues;
• We have worked with our friends and allies in the region to initiate new mechanisms for transparency and confidence building, including trilateral and multilateral meetings; defense forums; and combined education at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii; and
• We have focused attention on the threat from weapons of mass destruction, addressing potential proliferation through the Agreed Framework and missile nonproliferation talks with North Korea, and improving our capabilities for counterproliferation through various means, including research and development of theater missile defense.

3 Official U.S. Navy Photo

These steps are credible and sustainable because they are clearly in the interests of the United States, our allies and partners. Countries in the region watch our level of commitment as a key determinant of regional peace and stability. The dispatch of USS Nimitz and USS Independence during the March 1996 crisis, for instance, reaffirmed to Asia-Pacific nations U.S. commitment to peace and stability in the region. Consistent with our global security strategy, U.S. engagement in Asia provides an opportunity to help shape the region's future, prevent conflict and provide the stability and access that allows us to conduct approximately $500 billion a year in trans-Pacific trade.

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While our policies since the 1995 EASR have confirmed U.S. commitment to the region and strengthened bilateral relationships, areas of uncertainty remain and new challenges have emerged. North Korea's August 1998 missile launch and uncertainty over its commitment and adherence to the Agreed Framework threaten to set back the prospect for renewed South-North dialogue and progress in Four Party Talks to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and achieve a peace treaty. The Asian financial crisis has shaken the region's assumptions about uninterrupted economic development and is testing regional economic cooperation, globalization, and the livelihood of two billion Asians. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 also add new complications not only for South Asia but also for security calculations of Asia-Pacific nations.

5 Photo: PH1 John M. Thornton, USN

Indonesia's economic and political difficulties will pose challenges to the established order both internally and in the region. In Cambodia and Burma, domestic crises threaten the region's progress toward stable political cooperation. Historical mistrust and territorial disputes, including those in the South China Sea and elsewhere, remain unresolved, providing potential flashpoints over issues of sovereignty and nationalism. Crises outside the region, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, increasingly affect regional security, as Asia becomes more dependent on Gulf oil supplies for economic growth.

In spite of these challenges, however, we still see a region mostly at peace, where interests converge and the reservoir of political will to deal with new challenges runs deep. The intention of the United States is to help dampen the sources of instability by maintaining a policy of robust engagement, overseas presence and strengthened alliances, while searching for new opportunities to increase confidence and a spirit of common security. Where our strategy during the Cold War was primarily one of worldwide strategic deterrence, today we must deter actions in critical localized areas, such as the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining our capability to respond to crises should they emerge anywhere around the world. In time of peace, our responsibility also extends to taking actions that shape the strategic environment to sustain the peace and prevent conflict over time.

In this way, U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region reflects and supports our global security strategy. DOD's 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) presented the three integrated concepts of Shape, Respond, and Prepare: the United States will remain globally engaged to shape the international environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain future.

6 Photo: J02 Curt Melzer, USN

The United States aims to promote a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community in which the United States is an active player, partner and beneficiary. This fourth East Asia Strategy Report is not being issued because of a change in our security strategy. Our priorities remain constant, but as always, we remain ready to promote fresh approaches to security in response to changes in the regional environment.

Finally, the EASR process itself represents a fundamental U.S. interest to promote openness and transparency of force structure, defense strategy and military doctrine throughout the region. Transparency fosters understanding, and enhances trust and confidence among nations. Other nations may choose to challenge elements of this report, but they cannot claim ignorance of American intentions, approach and status in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. welcomes honest dialogue concerning this report as constructive for mutual understanding and trust, and we encourage the continued development of similar public documents throughout the region to promote these ends.