East Asia and the Pacific,
A National Security Strategy For A New Century
The White House, May 1997

The Japan-U.S. defense relationship is the cornerstone for a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 21st century.

The Japan-U.S. defense relationship is the cornerstone for a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 21st century.

Four years ago, President Clinton laid out his vision of a new Pacific community-a vision that links security interests with economic growth and our commitment to democracy and human rights. We now seek to build on that vision, cementing America's role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia Pacific region.

Our military presence has been essential to maintaining the stability that has enabled most nations in the AsiaPacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all. To deter regional aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain an active presence. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and our commitment to keeping approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, serve as the foundation for America's continuing security role.

We have supported new regional dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the full range of common security challenges. By meeting on confidencebuilding measures such as search and rescue cooperation and peacekeeping, the ARF can help enhance regional security and understanding.

Japan:

The United States and Japan reaffirmed last year that our bilateral security relationship remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia Pacific region as we enter the twentyfirst century. This security cooperation extends to promoting regional peace and stability, seeking universal adherence to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, and addressing the dangers posed by transfers of destabilizing conventional arms and sensitive dualuse goods and technologies. Our continued progress in assisting open trade between our two countries and our broadranging international cooperation exemplified by the Common Agenda provide a sound underpinning for our relations in the next century.

Korean Peninsula:

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to the peace and stability of the East Asia region. A peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a nonnuclear peninsula is in our strategic interest. A parallel strategic interest is the elimination of a chemical/biological threat on the peninsula. A productive NorthSouth dialogue would be a positive step in this direction. We are working to create conditions of stability by maintaining the U.S.Republic of Korea treaty alliance and our military presence; freezing and eventually dismantling the North Korean nuclear program under the Agreed Framework; developing bilateral contacts with the North aimed at drawing the North into a set of more normal relations with the region and the rest of the world; and following through on the offer of fourparty peace talks among the United States, China, and North and South Korea. Over the next four years, we will maintain solidarity with our South Korean ally, ensure that an isolated and struggling North Korea does not opt for a military solution to its problems, and emphasize America's commitment to shaping a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula. At the same time, we are willing to improve bilateral political and economic ties with the North, commensurate with its continued cooperation to resolve the nuclear issue, engagement in NorthSouth dialogue, continued efforts to recover remains of American servicemen missing since the Korean War, and cessation of its chemical and biological programs and ballistic missile proliferation activities.

China:

An overarching U.S. interest is China's emergence as a stable, open, secure and peaceful state. The prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China's role as a responsible member of the international community. China's integration into the international system of rules and norms will influence its own political and economic development, as well as its relations with the rest of the world. Our success in working with China as a partner in building a stable international order depends on establishing a productive relationship that will build sustained domestic support. We have already enhanced our cooperation in key areas, such as working for peace and stability in Korea, extending the NPT and completing the CTBT, and combating alien smuggling and drugs. Our key security objectives include:

  • sustaining the strategic dialogue begun by the recent series of high-level exchanges with attention to core interests on both sides;

  • resumption of the crossStrait dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, and a smooth transition in Hong Kong;

  • PRC adherence to international nonproliferation norms, establishment of a comprehensive export control system, and the conditions that would permit implementation of the 1985 agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and

  • the PRC's constructive role in international security affairs through active cooperation in APEC, ARF and the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue.

Southeast Asia:

Our strategic interest in Southeast Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationships that assist in conflict prevention and resolution and expand U.S. participation in the region's dynamic growth. Our policy combines two approaches: first, maintaining our increasingly productive relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam) especially our security dialogue under the ARF; and second, pursuing bilateral objectives with ASEAN's individual members and other Southeast Asian nations, designed to prevent political or military instability, establish marketoriented economic reforms, resist the flow of heroin from Burma, and encourage democratic reforms and improvements in human rights practices. Our security aims in Southeast Asia are twofold:

(1) maintaining robust security alliances with Canberra, Manila and Bangkok, as well as sustaining security access arrangements with Singapore and other ASEAN countries; and

(2) healthy, pragmatic relations with a strong, cohesive ASEAN capable of supporting regional stability and prosperity.

We are committed to sustaining the AsiaPacific region's remarkable dynamism. Opportunities for economic growth abound in Asia and underlie our strong commitment to multilateral economic cooperation. Today, the 18 member economies of APEC-comprising about one-third of the world's population produce $13 trillion and export $1.7 trillion of goods annually, about one-half of the global totals. U.S. exports to Asian economies support millions of American jobs, while U.S. direct investments in Asia represent about onefifth of total U.S. direct foreign investment. A prosperous and open AsiaPacific is key to the economic health of the United States. Annual APEC leaders meetings are a vivid testament to the possibilities of stimulating regional economic growth and cooperation-fostering trade and investment liberalization, while at the same time enhancing political and security ties within the region.

We are also working with major bilateral trade partners to improve trade relations. The United States and Japan have successfully completed over 20 bilateral trade agreements under the 1993 Framework Agreement, designed to open Japan's markets to U.S. goods. As U.S.China trade continues to grow, we place a high priority on bilateral and multilateral trade issues, such as intellectual property rights and market access.

Our economic objectives include: continued progress within APEC toward liberalizing trade and investment, increased exports to Asian countries through marketopening measures and leveling the playing field for U.S. business, and WTO accession for the PRC and Taiwan on satisfactory commercial terms.

Some have argued that democracy is unsuited for Asia or at least for some Asian nations that human rights are relative and that Western nations' support for international human rights standards simply mask a form of cultural imperialism. The democratic aspirations and achievements of Asian peoples themselves prove these arguments incorrect. We will continue to support those aspirations and to promote respect for human rights in all nations.

Each nation must find its own form of democracy, and we respect the variety of democratic institutions that have emerged in Asia. But there is no cultural justification for tyranny, torture or the denial of fundamental freedoms. Our strategy includes efforts to:

  • pursue a constructive, goaloriented approach to achieving progress on human rights and rule of law issues with China;

  • foster a meaningful dialogue between the ruling authorities in Burma and the democratic opposition;

  • promote improved respect for human rights and strengthened democratic processes in Indonesia and political reconciliation in East Timor;

  • build democratic institutions and encourage respect for human rights in Cambodia; and

  • promote improved respect for human rights in Vietnam and achieve the fullest possible accounting of missing U.S. service members.
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