Asia Pacific Defense Forum :: Winter 2006-2007

Initial steps in this region have included slowly and steadily reestablishing ties with the Indonesian military. The command initially engaged with their military through a series of two-week subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) and post-tsunami civic action projects. After conducting five SMEEs and several humanitarian assistance initiatives in eight months, the Indonesian military approached SOCPAC regarding expanding its role to advise and assist their forces. The SMEEs and civil-military operations set the conditions for continuing the partnership. We have now completed six combined events and several construction projects with the Indonesian military, which have increased the trust between the forces. More events are planned.

SOCPAC has also started achieving stronger military-to-military relationships in Malaysia. Success with Malaysian forces focuses largely on partnering during multinational naval exercises. The world-class training events and professionalism of U.S. forces impressed the Malaysian military, and we gained immensely from their state-of-the-art training facilities, which assisted SOCPAC efforts to execute realistic training scenarios. Strengthening ties with the three archipelago nations builds a solid foundation for a multilateral indirect approach to transnational security.

Thailand. In addition to the archipelago nations, SOCPAC counts on Thailand as an important regional partner. The command has enjoyed a rich relationship with the Thai military for many years. It consistently participates in a variety of combined training and exercises, maintaining extended relationships with some units. This military partnership demonstrates the importance of building on the trust already established with host nations.

The Thai military gives SOCPAC solid, quiet support. Its leaders have asked for advice and assistance in areas of concern and provide constructive feedback on the indirect approach. Because the relationship is strong, the Thai officers reveal when a specific approach does not work for them and how we might improve, all with complete candor. They are also open to our comments, a sure indicator of a firm relationship formed over time.

Effects-based Measurement
In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF strategy and operations in the war on terror in Southeast Asia are the results and changes that ensue. SOCPAC has established an effects-based assessment system that looks closely at its return on investment regarding activities with host nation partners, measuring the effects quarterly.

This effects-based system assesses how we are doing in building strong relationships and improving capacity—not simply counting the number of activities. The intent is to measure how effectively SOCPAC assists host nation partners in winning over populations and developing institutions of stability. The system has shown that we are making lasting progress even though the results are not instant. The effects-based approach helps the command prioritize efforts, shift resources, and ensure that the indirect approach remains focused and balanced.

Given its success in the southern Philippines, the command plans to partner with other countries to achieve similar effects, with host nation forces in the lead. Every situation is different and requires a program that is appropriate to the local context and needs of the stakeholders. The approach in other Asian nations will be methodical, assessing underlying conditions and host nation units, improving the socioeconomic and security situation at hand, enhancing the legitimacy of local government, and severing ties with terrorists.

In 5 to 10 years, the command will be working with new partner nations while sustaining existing partnerships. We have anchored relationships in the Philippines and Thailand and will continue growing partnerships in Malaysia and Indonesia. SOCPAC will most likely broaden indirect efforts to include working by, through, and with forces in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. The U.S. approach will continue to develop trusting relationships, with host nation partners in the lead. The command will engage these nations in a purposeful manner to ensure that it can build relationships as successfully as it did in Southeast Asia.

As it creates partnerships, the command looks forward to establishing strong links with U.S. Embassies and Asian multilateral security organizations. Diffusing terrorist organizations requires working together to offer alternative ideologies, economic opportunity, safety, different channels for political influence to travel, and ways to strengthen family and cultural ties outside of terrorist movements.

A better understanding of the concerns of stakeholders will aid the search for alternatives to political violence. This requires leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of U.S. and host nation diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement instruments of power in a coordinated and focused effort.

U.S. Special Operations Forces are uniquely organized and equipped to win the warfare of the 21st century. Through its actions and tangible results, Special Operations Command, Pacific, has demonstrated that the indirect approach is an effective model for addressing asymmetric threats.

By actively implementing an indirect approach, the command has shaped conditions so that commerce, rule of law, and education can flourish and provide alternatives to violence and despair. Relationships with host nation counterparts have provided a robust exchange of actionable recommendations that promote measurable results. This innovative approach is relevant in an increasingly complex security environment. Working by, through, and with multinational and interagency partners will be critical to continued success in combating terror in the Pacific.

NOTES

1 Pew Global Attitudes Project, America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas, June 13, 2006, available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>.
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 376.
3 According to Joint Publication 3–07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, foreign internal defense “is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” Unconventional warfare builds on the foundation of working by, through, and with indigenous or surrogate forces. Although the military and law enforcement agencies kill, capture, and detain terrorists, these direct action missions should not be at the expense of the “advise and assist” approach that foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare offer as their centerpiece.

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AFP and U.S. SOF troops lead the way in a live-fire demonstration at Fort Magsaysay.
Photo by Lt. Col. Jacki Lyons, USA

A U.S. Army SOF member shares an AFP/U.S. partnership badge with a child at a medical capabilities event in Jolo.
Official SOCPAC photo