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Foreword

Northeast Asia Engagement ::

People's Republic of China and U.S. Forces Enhancing Maritime Safety Throughout the Asia-Pacific Region

Proliferation Security Initiative Activities Attract International Interest

Cooperative Understanding ::

Cambodia-U.S. Navies Conduct Historic Exchange

Regional Response Forces ::

Indian, Canadian and U.S. Forces Partner for a Safer Asia-Pacific Region

RIMPAC 2006:
Fostering Regional Peace and Security

Philippine-U.S. Forces Building Interoperability and Goodwill

Happenings  ::

Happenings

Proliferation Security Initiative Activities
Attract International Interest
By Jacquelyn S. Porth

Jacquelyn S. Porth writes about security affairs and current issues for USINFO which is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. The Web site is http://usinfo.state.gov. LCmdr. Wesley Bringham, USN, contributed to this article. He is assigned to U.S. Pacific Command’s Directorate for Strategic Planning and Policy.

North Korea’s 9 October 2006 nuclear test sent reverberations throughout the international community and sparked heightened interest in counter proliferation measures. Pyongyang’s test, followed by the threat of a second one, and North Korea’s propensity for selling weapons and technology to the highest bidder have focused increased attention on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

PSI is a voluntary group of partner nations working together to halt the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. Over 80 states have expressed support for the initiative, which has been growing in popularity since its launch.

President Bush proposed PSI in Krakow, Poland, in 2003 in response to growing concerns that potential traffickers of weapons of mass destruction were trying to sidestep export controls and other enforcement measures to ply their proliferation trade. President Bush calls it “a very strong initiative to prevent proliferation.” Partner nations have met at various venues since the initiative was announced, and met again in June 2006 in Warsaw at Poland’s invitation to share their experiences.

Any nation interested in being part of the effort must endorse the PSI’s statement of principles and decide to what extent it wishes to be involved in activities such as exercises or interdiction operations. Involvement depends on a nation’s circumstances and capabilities. Some nations, for example, participate in periodic exercises or Operational Expert Group (OEG) meetings, while others may only observe exercises or participate in a more regional role. Canada hosted an OEG meeting in December 2006, and New Zealand hosted the latest OEG meeting in March 2007.

Intelligence Sharing, Joint Training Exercises – Key Activities
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said there is great concern that North Korea might try to make an illicit weapons transfer “to either another state, or, perhaps, even more alarmingly, to a non-state actor: a terrorist.” But she also has pointed to the effective intelligence sharing already under way as part of PSI, indicating that it could be used to interdict any dangerous cargo that North Korea might be trying to transfer.

Even before Pyongyang’s test, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld singled out North Korea as “a known proliferator of weapons technology,” warning that any number of proliferators may traffic by air, land or sea.

With attention focused on Northeast Asia, Japan has been involved fully in PSI. During her trip to Tokyo in October 2006, Secretary Rice said intensive consultations were under way in the region “on how to have a robust, effective means by which to give scrutiny to North Korean cargo.”

Countries such as the Republic of Korea have been approached about expanding cooperation or participation in PSI activities. With respect to China, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said in October 2006 that the Chinese “will make their own decisions about what kind of relationship they want” to have with PSI.

Secretary Rice said important PSI activities, including air, ground and maritime training exercises, have been conducted since cooperation was initiated. Turkey, for example, hosted a PSI exercise, ANATOLIA SUN, in May 2006. Central Asia and Gulf nations participated for the first time, working to develop capabilities to interdict shipments of concern.

The United States hosted the 25th PSI interdiction training exercise, LEADING EDGE, in October 2006. Other nations that have hosted or led PSI exercises, simulations or meetings include Australia, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Germany, Canada and Italy.

PSI Relies on and Complies with Existing Law
All PSI activities are carried out on a national basis according to the laws of participating countries and must comply with international legal frameworks. As an example, ship inspections within a PSI nation’s seaport for the purpose of WMD interdiction are subject to its own legal authorities. PSI in itself does not add new legal authorities, but seeks to use existing legal authorities in innovative ways to stop the flow of WMD, related materials, and associated WMD delivery systems.

Secretary Rice noted PSI relies on legal authorities that nations already have “to make certain that there is no trade in dangerous weapons or weapons materials.” She said there has been some misunderstanding about the initiative, and that it is not solely about random ship inspections.

A series of ship-boarding agreements have been concluded as part of the initiative that make it easier for PSI partner nations to board and inspect suspicious vessels. The United States, for example, has signed reciprocal boarding agreements with Croatia, Liberia, Panama and the Marshall Islands.

There also has been outreach to representatives of the shipping industry on the subject of PSI cooperation. For example, the United Kingdom hosted a workshop in London in September 2006 that focused on how governments and representatives of the maritime industry can cooperate to intercept WMD-related shipments without disrupting the legitimate flow of cargo. An air cargo industry workshop was held in California, USA, in September 2005 and a maritime workshop in Denmark in August 2004.

The message to the maritime industry is that PSI nations are determined to stop the illicit flow of WMD and related material and that it is in the industry’s interest to assist in these efforts.

U.S. officials have said that the initiative has transformed the way countries harness diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and intelligence assets to disrupt proliferation networks.

In her 2005 remarks on the second anniversary of the initiative, Secretary Rice said the quiet international cooperation of PSI partners led to around a dozen successful efforts to halt the transshipment of materials and equipment intended for ballistic missile programs in countries of concern, including Iran. PSI partners continue to encourage all nations to participate actively in combating a global proliferation problem. As Secretary Rice said, “The dangerous trade in weapons of mass destruction can only be stopped through coordinated and continued efforts by the international community.”

Additional information about the initiative and other counter proliferation efforts is available on the State Department Web site (http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm), as is the full text of the PSI Statement of Principles.

E-mail: apdforum@apan-info.net